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Abstract  
This paper analyses the game relationship between port authorities and ship owners under the 
new inspection regime (NIR). Based on 49328 inspection reports from Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) (2015-2017), we present a Bayesian Network (BN) model to 
determine vessel detention rates after adding company performance as a new indicator in 
PSC inspection. A strategic game model is formulated by incorporating the BN model 
outcomes. The optimal inspection rate from the game model can help improve port authority 
performance in PSC. An empirical study is conducted to illustrate the insights of the results 
and provide suggestions for port authorities. 
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maritime safety, maritime risk 
 
1. Introduction  
Traditional flag state control has its limits in terms of ensuring the implementation of maritime 
safety regulations by ship owners, particularly those choosing open registration. Therefore, 
Port State Control (PSC), which renders port authorities the ability to inspect foreign vessels 
in their own ports, is set up in order to avoid the entries of sub-standard ships into their waters 
and the occurrence of maritime accidents. Since established in 1982, PSC is gradually viewed 
as the last safety line of defending sub-standard vessels and improving maritime safety because 
it effectively reduces the appearance of the vessels not fully following the relevant maritime 
safety regulations. Nevertheless, it is not perfect, leaving the gaps to be addressed and new 
solutions to be found. According to the PSC inspection records, every year there are still a large 
number of vessels that do not comply the regulations reckoned by port authorities and fail to 
pass their inspections, indicating the deficiencies of the PSC system in terms of motivating ship 
owners to improve vessel quality. Because of the high maintenance cost, some ship owners do 
not tackle the safety loopholes of their vessels in time. Although facing possible high 
punishment when his vessel is detained, a ship owner still gambles and takes the risk, as it is 
impossible for port authorities to inspect all the vessels entering their ports. From the 
perspective of port authorities, on one hand, excessive PSC inspections may harm the 
competitiveness of the ports and increase the burden of ship owners, leading ship owners to 
turn to other destinations that may have a more relaxed inspection policy (Li et al., 2014). On 
the other hand, a loose inspection policy is not helpful to stimulate ship owners to implement 
high intensive maintenance effort, which in return attracts sub-standard ships and possibly 
causes the occurrence of accidents and consequently economic loss and damage to reputation. 
Therefore, striking a PSC inspection balance between port authorities and ship owners requires 
a scientific decision for rational policymaking. While the port authorities aim at motivating 
ship owners to maintain their vessels at a high safety level to mitigate maritime accidents, ship 
owners care more about minimization of the associated costs. Such conflict of interests 
thereupon forms the game relationship between the two stakeholders.        
To improve the PSC inspection system, the much-anticipated New Inspection Regime (NIR) 
was launched in 2011. According to Paris MoU Annual Report (2011), it is viewed as the most 
significant change that transforms and modernizes the PSC system in recent years. Under the 
new inspection system, the vessel visiting a port will be attributed a ship risk profile through 
an associated information system, which determines the priority of ship inspections, the 
intervals between the inspections of a ship and the scope of the inspections. Based on the 
feedback, the port authority will decide the details of the inspections, (inspection types, 
detention results, and detention periods). The Paris MoU hoped that the implementation of NIR 
could efficiently improve the performance of PSC inspection system. 
It is noteworthy that an important element that helps to categorize the ship risk profiles in NIR 
is the performance of International Shipping Management (ISM) companies. Before the 
implementation of NIR, ISM companies are just third-party managers who, for a negotiated 
fee and with no shareholding ties with their clients, undertake the responsibility of managing 
vessels in which they have no financial stake (Mitroussi, 2003). They accepted ships from and 
managed them on behalf of ship owners without much concern on their technical soundness 
given that they had no responsibility on vessels’ failures of passing PSC inspections. However, 
this practice has been changed since the NIR was introduced in 2009 and implemented in 2011 
on Paris MoU. Paris MoU establishes a shipping company (including ISM) performance 
formula that takes into account detention and deficiency records of the vessels under the 
company’s management over a period of 36 months. Based on the deficiency and detention 
rates, the performance of ISM companies is classified into groups of four grades: high, medium, 
low and very low. A list of ‘ISM managers’ of poor performance has been developed, consisting 
of the ISM companies who have shown an unwillingness or inability to comply with the 
international conventions on maritime safety and/or on the protection of marine environment. 
Once a vessel is detained, the reputation of its associated ISM will be affected, leading to an 
increase frequency of inspections in future.  
To ensure their profits and maintain their reputation, ISM companies are putting much effort 
to make them adaptive to the NIR and improving their management level. Considering the 
vessel quality, ISM companies raise their vessel acceptance criteria to ensure the successful 
inspection results that the ships under their management can receive. The involvement of ISM 
companies obviously influences the game between port authorities and ship owners in today’s 
PSC practice.   
For port authorities, when regulating their policies under NIR, it is of vital importance to take 
the company performance indicator into account. However, in this research, as we only focus 
on the period in which the vessel is already at the port, ISM companies are considered as a 
factor influencing the decision-making of port authorities, because the selection and 
determination of ISM companies happen before the occurrence of the inspections. Therefore, 
quantifying the influence of company performance on inspection results becomes the major 
issue when analysing the PSC inspection game under NIR in this research. Further research 
may consider ISM companies as a player in the inspection game if the time range of the game 
is widened.   
This study aims at developing a risk-based game model based on Bayesian network (BN) to 
determine the optimal inspection strategy of a port authority under different circumstances after 
the implementation of NIR. Based on 49328 primary historical inspection reports obtained 
from the Paris MoU database in 2015-2017, those related to bulk carriers (i.e. 10000 records) 
are selected to build a BN risk model. The BN risk model provides a novel way to obtain the 
detention rates relating to different company performance levels and vessel quality. They can 
be used as important input in the subsequent game model construction. Through calculating 
every payoff during an inspection, a payoff matrix is utilized to present the new BN risk-based 
PSC game model. 
The main contributions of this paper include: 1) to the authors’ best knowledge, since NIR 
went into effect in 2011, company performance is, for the first time, viewed as an important 
factor influencing the decisions of port authorities in PSC inspection practice and scientific 
research; 2) BN and game theory are innovatively incorporated to exploit a rational way to 
precisely quantify the relationship between the port authority and ship owner during an 
inspection process; 3) it is the first attempt and presentation of a non-cooperative strategic game 
between port authorities and ship owners after the implementation of NIR. An optimal 
inspection policy for port authorities is derived from a Nash equilibrium solution; 4) New 
managerial insights about the optimal inspection rate (policy) are obtained. For instance, with 
the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection rates present a decreasing trend 
regardless the vessel condition. The declining speed of the optimal inspection rates slows down 
with the increase of punishment severity; 5) the proposed optimal inspection policy is able to 
provide real-time PSC decisions for port authorities in dynamic situations accordingly, where 
the risks constantly change; 6) suggestions are proposed to help port authorities of different 
economic constrains to make rational decisions. For instance, when a port authority has limited 
economic constrains, it should choose the optimal inspection rate as suggested by the game 
model; otherwise it can increase the punishment to an appropriate level as suggested by the 
model, to tackle the sub-standard effort and illegal actions of ship owners. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current literature 
focusing on the risk analysis relating to PSC inspections and presents the state of the art of 
game applications in maritime safety research. Section 3 describes the process of developing a 
theoretical framework for an optimal inspection policy based on the combination of BN and 
the game theory. It is followed by an empirical study, result analysis and implications in section 
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes this study with reference to its scientific and practical 
contributions, limitations and future research directions.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 Risk analysis on PSC inspections 
Since PSC inspections play an increasingly important role in maritime safety, more and more 
researchers have conducted related studies from both qualitative to quantitative perspectives. 
Various risk assessment approaches have been developed and applied in the past decades, 
demonstrating the diversity of this research field.  
Knowing that intense maritime traffic may cause significant navigational challenges in Istanbul 
Strait, Kara (2016) applied a weighted point method to assess the risk level of each vessel 
experiencing the PSC inspections under the Black Sea MoU. However, the weighting and 
scoring method adopted in this study was at large based on subjective expert judgements, which 
potentially caused bias on the results.  
Avoiding subjectivity in weighting has been extensively studied. Xu et al. (2007) presented a 
risk assessment system based on support vector machine to estimate the risk of candidate 
vessels according to historical data before conducting on-board inspections. Evaluations 
showed that the proposed system could improve the accuracy of risk assessment. Furthermore, 
Gao et al. (2008) combined support vector machine and K-nearest neighbour approaches to 
develop a new risk assessment model capable of coping with noisy data. Consequently, this 
method significantly improved the accuracy of the results. Although showing attractiveness, 
such methods still reveal problems in their practical applications in tackling dynamic risk 
prediction (e.g. ship detention probability) in different environments. This problem hinders the 
practical contribution of risk assessment approaches in PSC inspections. To solve this issue, 
Yang et al. (2018) utilized the BN to develop a detention rate prediction tool for port authorities. 
The advantages of BN over other risk assessment approaches in dynamic prediction provides 
important insights for us to seek the optimal inspection policies under different environments 
in NIR. However, Yang et al. (2018) only addressed risk analysis and did not conduct further 
studies on how the dynamic risk results can realise the optimization of inspection policy 
making of port authorities in PSC.  
Based on 183,819 PSC inspection records, Knapp & Franses (2007) applied binary logistic 
regression to measure the effect of inspections on the probability of casualties, especially for 
the accidents involving very serious consequences. Meanwhile, the model determined the 
magnitude of improvable areas for sub-standard vessels. Later in the same year, they did a 
further econometric analysis about the influence of different risk factors on the detention 
probability, and the results indicated that only vessel types and PSC regimes were influential 
elements of great significance.  
Compared to other risk assessment approaches, BN is widely used to evaluate maritime and 
port risks because of its advantages in forward prediction analysis and backward risk diagnosis 
(e.g. Ren et al., 2008; Eleye-Datubo et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2013; Goerlandt & Montewka, 
2015; Banda, O.A.V. et al., 2016; Pristrom et al., 2016)). However, few researchers investigated 
its effectiveness and potential in analysing the risks relating to PSC inspections. Hänninen & 
Kujala (2014) explored the dependencies of PSC inspection findings and vessel’s involvement 
in accidents and incidents by using two learning algorithms to train BNs. The results showed 
that vessel type, inspection type and the number of structural conditions related deficiencies 
were among the most important factors influencing accident involvement. In addition, Yang et 
al. (2018) proposed a data-driven BN model involving multiple risk factors, to analyse their 
individual and combined effect on PSC inspections, and to develop a real-time prediction tool 
for port authorities to rationalize their inspections.  
However, such studies focused on the PSC inspection system before the implementation of 
NIR, meaning the influence of company performance on inspection results is overlooked. As 
an important factor in new PSC inspection system, company performance is introduced when 
building BN for PSC inspections in this study. Furthermore, none of them had ever undertaken 
further studies to look at how the dynamic risk analysis result can assist port authorities in the 
development of rational inspection policies in their PSC practice.   
2.2 Game theory applications in transportation  
Game theory has been widely applied to stimulate policy making in transportation. Among 
different transport modes, road transportation shows a dominating position in terms of the use 
of game theory (e.g. Alberto et al, 1995; Hideyuki Kita, 1999; Chidambaram et al, 2014) and 
sea transport has taken a role of backseat in this aspect. Most of the researchers in road 
transportation focus on transportation network issues. Bell (2000) proposed a two-player non-
cooperative game to minimise the expected trip costs, as well as measure the performance 
reliability of the transportation network through analysing the mixed strategy by Nash 
equilibrium. Levinson (2005) developed the congestion theory and pricing theory through two-
player and three-player games. Based on this study, it proposed an improved model that 
corrected the calculated tolls and Nash equilibria predicted for the three-player game model in 
transportation network. Sasaki (2014) also did similar research on the optimal choices of a fare 
collection system considering the game-theoretical interactions between the transit agency and 
passengers. Other topics related to transportation network include the network design (Lin & 
Lee, 2010; Laporte et al., 2010), the cost allocation (Rosenthal, 2017), traffic-response signal 
control (Ruth et al., 2015), the role of privately owned road system in road network (Sofia, 
2012) and green transportation (Bae et al., 2011).  
In the maritime transportation field, inspection games are mainly presented from a quantitative 
orientation. In this game, port authorities tried to constrain the illegal actions of ship owners 
through inspection policies, regulations and punishments, while ship owners pursued the 
minimum costs to pass the inspections (Avenhaus et al, 1996; Baston and Bostock, 1991; Canty 
et al., 2001; Von Stengel, 1991; Rothenstein and Zamir, 2002).  
In order to analyse the policies of PSC inspections, Li and Tapiero (2010) outlined a random 
payoff game-theoretical framework for vessel inspections at ports considering two kinds of 
error prone decisions (e.g. detaining a standard vessel or releasing a sub-standard vessel). The 
authors presented some particular Stackelberg solutions given different scenarios to highlight 
the effects and the implication of inspection costs and their derivatives. They paid enough 
attention on the inspections of potentially non-complying ship operators to regulations and sub-
standard performance. Based on this research, Li et al. (2015) further developed a game model 
to decide on the optimal inspection level and the target of the inspection. A bi-matrix game 
between port authorities and ship owners was built based on the same two types of error prone 
decisions discussed in 2010. Different from the previous studies, this time the authors generated 
a Nash equilibrium solution representing the optimal inspection rate for port authorities. A 
numerical study was conducted to illustrate the optimal inspection strategy, which yielded 
significant savings for port authorities, as well as prevented potential violations of ship owners. 
Although showing significant insights for port authorities, there are still several deficiencies 
existing in both studies , i.e. 1) both studies were conducted before the implementation of NIR, 
not taking into account company performance as an important factor influencing the decision-
making of port authorities in today’s PSC practice; 2) when carrying out the numerical studies 
in the two works, the authors assumed that the work of the authorities was perfect and had no 
inspection risk exists, which was obviously idealized and thus had limited practical 
contributions. Hence, when establishing the new game model in this paper, both the 
contribution of company performance and the influence of inspection risk on the decisions of 
port authorities are investigated and considered, highlighting the main differences with and 
improvements from the two most related papers in the existing literature.  
Environmental control is another form of the inspection game in transport studies. Bird and 
Kortanek (1974) explored various theoretical cooperative n-person games in order to aid the 
formulation of regulations concerning sources of pollutants in the atmosphere subject to the 
given least cost solutions. Russell (1990) introduced a specific type of stochastic model by 
allowing for errors of inference on the part of the agency due to imperfect monitoring 
instruments. Gueth & Pethig (1990) analysed a signalling game between a polluting firm that 
could save costs by illegal waste emission and a monitoring agency whose responsibility was 
to prevent such pollution. 
In maritime safety area, terrorist threat draws attention. Reilly et al. (2012) used the game 
theory to model the interactions between a government agency, a carrier and a terrorist. A 
heuristic solution procedure was constructed to identify effective prohibitions and validated by 
a real case study in the continental US. The model was also suitable for rail networks. Sandler 
& Arce (2003), Sandler & Enders (2003) utilized the game theory to model terrorism as well. 
In the other maritime transport research areas, among the game studies were port competition 
(Ishii et al., 2013; Song et al., 2016), ship overload (Chen & Hu, 2014) and safety supervision 
(Yuan, 2008). 
In general, PSC inspections present a strategic problem, and the inspection policies demand to 
be settled properly and optimally. Game theory, as a mathematical tool to study the conflicts 
and cooperation between decision-makers, is selected to solve this issue. Meanwhile, due to 
the implementation of NIR, company performance becomes a key influencing variable and 
indeed needs to be considered as a risk factor in decision-making process of PSC inspections, 
revealing a new research gap to be fulfilled.  
3. Theoretical game between port authorities and ship owners 
The process of developing a game model consists of three essential steps: 1) confirming the 
participated players, 2) figuring out the strategy of each player, and 3) determining the payoff 
of each strategy. When making decisions, both port authorities and ship owners will make their 
choices based on the payoffs of the strategies under different situations. As one of the important 
factors in game model, the inspection risk plays a key role in determining the payoffs. Hence, 
in order to quantify the inspection risk, BN is combined with the game model for the first time 
to precisely reflect the actual conditions in PSC after the implementation of NIR. Meanwhile, 
the BN model proposed in this paper takes into account company performance as an important 
risk factor influencing the inspection results, and the final model is able to reveal the detention 
rates under various conditions involving different company performance levels. In the 
subsequent game model construction, the detention rate can be used as an indicator of the 
company performance, presenting a game model between port authorities and ship owners 
considering the effect of company performance for the first time since PSC inspection regime 
changed.  
3.1 BN for PSC inspection after the NIR1   
When a vessel accepts an inspection at port, it may face two types of risks (Li et al., 2015). 
One is that the vessel is found non-conforming to the inspection requirements and detained 
when in fact it is a standard vessel. The other is the inspection shows the vessel conforms to 
the regulations when in fact it is a sub-standard vessel. The existence of the two types of 
inspection risks largely affects the estimate of the detention rate, which is an important factor 
influencing the inspection policy of port authorities and thus the construction of the game 
model. In order to make the model best reflect the reality, the inspection risks need to be 
                                                 
1 The analysis of PSC inspection before the NIR has been conducted in Yang et al., (2018).  
considered in our model. 
Taking advantage of causal inference, BN is utilized in this paper to obtain the detention rate 
under different situations. As a powerful risk assessment approach, it has the ability to calculate 
the detention rate in consideration of the inspection risks detected from historical inspection 
records. Whenever the information about a specific inspection is collected, ship owners or the 
port authorities can use the BN to calculate the detention rate of the vessel. Compared to other 
risk assessment model, it combines the visualization with mathematical knowledge, enabling 
the analysis of the relationships between different risk factors. The process of developing BN 
is presented as follows1. 
3.1.1 Data acquisition 
The dataset in this study consists of 49328 inspection records from 2015-2017, which are 
derived from the Paris MoU online inspection database (www.parismou.org/inspection-
search/inspection-search). Each inspection record presents the details of the inspection and 
information of the inspected vessel.  
A careful analysis of the inspection records indicates that bulk carriers play a dominating 
role, as the number of inspection records of bulk carriers counts 20% of the total. Therefore, 
bulk carriers are selected as the research target in this paper. 
3.1.2 Variable identification 
The variables in the BN are identified from the inspection records, including vessel flag, vessel 
age, company performance, type of inspection, port of inspection, date of inspection, number 
of deficiencies, and detention. It is noteworthy that company performance is included as one 
of the major risk factors in the Paris MoU online inspection database. Since the implementation 
of NIR, most ISM companies have raised their adoption policies to maintain their reputation in 
spite of facing possible toll losses. As a result, company performance is currently one of the 
relevant indexes reflecting vessel safety conditions and inspection results. 
These variables are explained with the particular reference to their state definitions as follows. 
Table 1. Identified variables in PSC inspections 
VARIABLE STATE 
Vessel flag 
White, Grey, Black, Black (high risk) 
(The performance of each state decreases successively.) 
                                                 
1 The detailed information of the construction of BN for PSC is found in Yang et al., (2018). Here a brief 
introduction of each involved step is provided to keep the integrity of the whole risk-based game framework in 
this paper. In addition, it is also necessary given the facts that 1) the data used in this work is new, reflecting the 
changed practical situation after the introduction of the NIR in 2009; and 2) the BN model is updated by the 
addition of ISM performance as a new factor/node influencing ship detention rates.  
Vessel age 
0 to 5 years, 5 to10 years, 10 to15 years, 15 to 20 years, over 20 
years 
Company performance High, Medium, Low, Very low 
Type of inspection Initial inspection, More detailed inspection, Expanded inspection 
Port of inspection 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, UK 
Data of inspection 2015, 2016, 2017 
Number of deficiencies 
0, 1 to 3, 4 to 9, more than 10 
(The number of inspected deficiencies are integer, e.g. ‘0’ means 0 
deficiency in inspection, and ‘1 to 3’ means the number of 
deficiencies are 1, 2 or 3). 
Inspection group High detention Risk, Low detention Risk 
Vessel group High detention Risk, Low detention Risk 
Detention Yes, No 
* The justification of the selection of the variables and their grades refers to Yang et al., (2018).  
It is noteworthy that the two intermediate level risk variables are introduced based on the 
principle of divorcing approach (Jensen, 2001; Yang et al., 2018) to avoid that the size of 
conditional probability tables (CPTs) are too large to effectively control. Additionally, the two 
nodes are comprehensive factors representing the overall level of vessel-related detention risk 
and inspection-related detention one, which act as the indicators reflecting the safety level of 
vessels in the game model later.   
3.1.3 BN construction 
The structure of BN in this study is learned via a data-driven approach, called TAN learning 
(Friedman et al., 1997; Carvalho et al., 2007). Through the Netica software, the result is 
presented in Figure 1. Although showing similarity, the new BN model in Figure 1 is different 
with the one in Yang et al. (2018) due to the addition of the node “Company performance” and 
the totally new data representing the situation after the NIR. It is because of this difference that 
the comparison of the detention results with and without the NIR makes significant practical 
insights on the importance of the NIR to improve maritime safety.  
 Figure 1. The structure of BN  
3.1.4 Conditional probability distribution and risk prediction 
After confirming the structure of the BN, the conditional probabilities of the nodes are required 
to model the uncertainties of risk variables. In this study, the CPTs are formulated by a gradient 
descent approach (Jensen, 1999; Bottou, 2010). 
Once the BN structure and CPTs are properly constructed, the unobservable situations 
associated with the PSC inspections can be predicted through the generated posterior 
probabilities when observable evidence (e.g. root nodes such as vessel age and vessel flag) is 
provided. Therefore, BN is served as the prediction tool to provide a precise foreseen detention 
rate (validated by real data, see Yang et al. 2008) under different situations in the inspection 
game.   
3.2 Game model construction 
The inspection games between port authorities and ship owners are more like ‘supervise-being 
supervised’ activities. In this type of game, the main objective of port authorities is to optimize 
the social welfare (Florens & Foucher, 1999). Therefore, port authorities take measures to 
ensure maritime safety, such as maritime safety regulations and conventions and the 
punishment on illegal ship owners. Although these measures cannot completely eradicate 
potential maritime hazards, they can certainly stimulate ship owners to improve the quality of 
their vessels. Simultaneously, ship owners aim at maximizing their benefits, resulting in the 
search of a balance between the costs and detention. The conflict of objectives forms the game 
relationship between the port authorities and ship owners.  
3.2.1 Assumptions 
Before constructing the game model, several assumptions are proposed to conform to the 
definition of the strategic game. According to the definition and interpretations from Osborne 
& Rubinstein (1994), the following assumptions are made in this study: 
(1) Vessels investigated in this study are bulk carriers, as explained in Section 3.1.1. (i.e. taking 
up 20% of the overall reports). 
(2) The purposes of different stakeholders are as follows.  
Ship owners: for maximizing personal interest 
Port authorities: for minimizing social welfare losses 
(3) The game is a strategic game, and each player holds the correct expectation about the other 
players’ behaviour and acts rationally based on the information about the way that the game 
was played in the past.  
(4) The players make decisions independently and simultaneously, and each player is unaware 
of the choices being made by the other players. 
(5) There are two types of bulk carriers, standard vessels (i.e. M) and sub-standard vessels (i.e. 
m). 
(6) The accident losses caused by standard or sub-standard vessels are the same.  
3.2.2 Parameter identification 
From the definition of the strategic game, it consists of three elements: 1) a finite set of players, 
2) a nonempty set of strategies for each player and 3) a preference relation on the set of 
strategies. Under a wide range of circumstances, the preference relation of a player in a strategic 
game can be represented by a payoff function (also called a utility function). The value of the 
function is referred as payoff (utility). Therefore, when building the inspection game in this 
study, the parameters need to be identified from these three aspects.  
Players 
It is obvious that the inspection game involves two players: port authorities and ship owners. 
Strategies 
(1) Strategy of the port authorities 
There are two strategies for the port authorities to treat the vessels arriving at their ports 
 Inspect the vessel (with probability X) 
 Not inspect the vessel (with the probability 1 – X) 
(2) Strategy of ship owners 
When confronted with the inspections, ship owners can pay either a high intensive effort to 
ensure the vessel to be standard or a low effort to leave the vessel sub-standard. The strategies 
are expressed as follow. 
 High intensive effort: Standard vessels (with probability Y) 
 Low effort: Sub-standard vessels (with probability 1-Y) 
Payoffs 
In any game, payoffs are numbers that represent the motivations of the players. Depending on 
different games, payoffs may represent profit, quantity, continuous measures (cardinal payoffs), 
and/or the rank of desirable outcomes (ordinal payoffs). According to the objectives of the 
players in PSC inspections, the payoffs in the inspection games is defined as profit.  
Based on the literatures (e.g. Li et al., 2015) and the inspection record reports, the profit of ship 
owners consists of the following components: expected detention cost, expected accident loss, 
inspection cost, maintenance cost and the port charges. Accordingly, the profit of port 
authorities includes social welfare increase due to detention, the social welfare loss due to 
accidents, inspection cost, and the port charges.  
These parameters influencing payoffs are explained with a particular reference to their state 
definitions as follows. 
(1)  Expected detention cost 
Related to the choice of port authorities, the expected detention cost is the risk that ship owners 
face when accepting inspections. Only when the port authorities decide to inspect their vessels, 
it incurs. Meanwhile, because the inspection results are subject to errors, there exist detention 
rates (likelihood) for both standard vessels and sub-standard vessels. 
Detention rate: D 
Detention rate is the probability that a vessel fails to pass the inspection. Meanwhile, it acts 
like a bond linking ship owners, port authorities and ISM companies. Its value can be obtained 
through the BN model in Section 3.  
Detention-related cost of ship owners: CD1 
In general, a ship is not released from detention before all necessary repairs are made, and it 
even needs to sail to another shipyard for repair if it is not possible to repair these deficiencies 
at the places of the inspections. Such detention-related cost during the detention period is 
summarized as the consequence of detention.  
According to the definition of risk (i.e. Risk = Likelihood * Consequence), the expected 
detention cost is the product of detention rate and detention-related cost.  
Expected detention cost = detention rate (D) * detention related cost (CD1) 
(2) Expected social welfare increase due to detention 
Other than the expected detention cost to ship owners, detention also brings social welfare 
increase to port authorities. The punishment to shipowners makes their vessels safer and better, 
as well as generates additional earnings for the ports. This part is set as CD2. 
However, the detention-related cost of ship owners does not equal to the increase of social 
welfare because some cost types of the former are not included in the latter, e.g. operating cost, 
and fuel cost (if a ship needs to sail to another place for repair).  
Similar to the expected detention cost, the expected social welfare increase is the product of 
detention rate and the punishment.  
Expected social welfare increase = detention rate (D) * punishment (CD2) 
(3)  Expected accident loss 
Expected accident loss is the risk of the vessel being caught in maritime accidents. It is 
composed of accident rate and accident loss.  
Accident rate: P 
Maritime transportation is risky and hazardous. When sailing at sea, every vessel will face the 
dangers of maritime accidents. On this occasion, shipowners’ effort really matters. A standard 
and compliant vessel is less likely than a sub-standard one to be caught in an accident.  
 PM: accident probability of standard vessel 
 Pm: accident probability of sub-standard vessel  
Accident loss: CA 
Accident loss is the consequential cost related to ship owners when an accident happens. 
Different effort of ship owners can influence the severity of loss, and standard vessel is more 
likely to better deal with emergencies and cause less loss. Because of limited data availability, 
the value of vessel is chosen to represent the accident loss in this paper.  
 CA1: accident loss of standard vessels 
 CA2: accident loss of sub-standard vessels 
As a result, the expected accident loss is calculated via the following equation, 
Expected Accident loss = accident rate (P) * accident loss (CA) 
(4) Social welfare loss of accidents: CSW 
When an accident happens, it will lead to the loss of social welfare. This type of loss includes 
environmental pollution, salvage cost, recovery cost and so on. Port authorities should take 
these losses into their account when calculating social welfare loss. Similar to accident loss of 
ship owners, different vessel safety levels will cost differently.  
 CSW1: social welfare loss of standard vessels  
 CSW2: social welfare loss of sub-standard vessels 
(5) Inspection cost CI 
When making the decision to inspect a vessel, port authorities need to spend money and human 
resources. At the same time, it will incur a cost to ship owners as well.  
 CI1: inspection cost of port authorities 
 CI2: inspection cost of ship owners 
(6) Maintenance cost of ship owners: C (Pi, i) 
In order to pass inspections and avoid maritime accidents, ship owners will spend a certain 
amount of money and resources, including technological, operational and preventive costs. The 
more they invest the higher probability they pass the inspections and avoid the occurrence of 
accidents. This type of cost is presented as C (Pi, i), i = m, or M 
 C (PM, M): cost to maintain standard vessels 
 C (Pm, m): cost to maintain sub-standard vessels 
 (7) Port charges: CPC 
When a vessel arrives at a port, it will face some different types of charges from port, e.g. 
tonnage dues, harbour dues, pilotage dues, berth hire charges and anchorage fee. Unlike 
detention cost and inspection cost, costs in this part is indispensable for all vessels, no matter 
the vessel is standard or sub-standard, detained or not detained.  
3.2.3 The payoff matrix 
In order to determine the optimal strategy for each player, a payoff matrix is applied in this 
study. It is an m×n matrix that gives the possible payoff of a two-person game when player 1 
has m strategies and player 2 has n strategies. This visual representation approach can describe 
the payoff of each player under different strategy profiles in Table 2.  
Table 2. An example of a payoff matrix 
                           C D 
A w1, w2 y1, y2 
B x1, x2 z1, z2 
 
Player 1’s strategies are identified with the rows and player 2’s with the columns. The two 
numbers in each cell are the players’ payoffs when player 1 chooses the row strategy and player 
2 chooses the column one. For example, the two numbers w1 and w2 in first cell means when 
player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy C, the payoff of player 1 is w1 and 
the payoff of player 2 is w2. 
When formulating the payoff matrix, the primary work is to figure out the payoffs under 
different strategy combinations. Based on the identified parameters and the information 
provided above, the payoff functions of port authorities and ship owners under different 
situations are provided in equation (1) and equation (2). For the different pairs of strategy 
combinations, the payoff of each stakeholder can be obtained via inserting the values of 
parameters reflecting the investigated situation into corresponding function. 
Payoff of port authorities = (Expected social welfare increase due to detention – Expected 
social welfare loss of accident - inspection cost + port charges)                                            (1) 
Payoff of ship owners = - (expected detention cost + expected accident loss + inspection 
cost + maintenance cost + port charges)                                                                                    (2) 
Scenario 1: Inspection (port authorities) and standard vessel (ship owners) 
(1) Payoff of port authorities 
There are two possible results: detention or no detention. From equation (1), there are four 
components to form the payoff.  
Expected social welfare increase exists only when detention occurs, hence it is CD2 when the 
vessel is detained, otherwise it is 0. 
Expected social welfare loss of an accident always exists whatever the inspection result is. In 
this scenario, the accident rate is PM; and the social welfare loss when an accident happens is 
CSW1. Therefore, the expected social welfare loss is PM × CSW1. Other components, the 
inspection cost and port charges, can be easily obtained as CI1 and CPC, respectively.  
In summary, the payoff of port authorities is: 
 If the vessel is detained (DM) 
𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
 If the vessel is not detained (1- DM) 
0 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
Overall payoff: 
𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
(2) Payoff of ship owners 
According to equation (2), the payoff of ship owners consists of five parts. 
Similar to the expected social welfare increase, the expected detention cost is also influenced 
by the inspection results. If the vessel is detained, the detention-related cost is CD1. If not, ship 
owners do not need to pay anything.  
Since the vessel is at a standard safety level, the probability it encounters an accident is PM, 
while the consequence of the maritime accident for ship owners is CA1. Hence, the expected 
accident loss is PM ×CA1. 
In addition, to ensure the vessel’s compliance with regulation standards, it will cost ship owners 
C (PM, M) to maintain the vessel. Furthermore, the inspection cost CI1 and the port charges CPC 
are important expenditure of ship owners. In summary, the payoff of ship owners is: 
 If the vessel is detained (DM) 
−(𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
 If the vessel is not detained (1- DM) 
−(0 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
Overall payoff: 
−(𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
Scenario 2: Inspection (port authorities) and sub-standard vessel (ship owners) 
In this scenario, the way to calculate the payoffs of each player is similar to scenario 1. The 
components of payoff need to change to the corresponding values of sub-standard vessels based 
on the information provided in parameter identification section, e.g. DM to Dm, PM to Pm, C (PM, 
M) to C (Pm, m), CA1 to CA2 and CSW1 to CSW2. 
However, when a sub-standard vessel is detained, it is asked to repair the deficiencies until the 
vessel complies with the regulations of the port. This process will improve the safety level of 
the vessel and reduce the accident probability. In this study, in order to simplify the model, the 
accident rate is set as PM for the sub-standard vessel after its detention. At the same time, the 
expected accident loss and expected social welfare loss also change as follows. 
Expected accident loss= {
PM×CA1,  detention
Pm×CA2,  no detention
 
Expected social welfare loss= {
PM×CSW1,  detention
Pm×CSW2,  no detention
 
(1) Payoff of port authorities 
 If the vessel is detained (Dm) 
𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
 If the vessel is not detained (1- Dm) 
0 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
Overall payoff: 
𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 − 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2) 
(2) Payoff of ship owners 
 If the vessel is detained (Dm) 
−(𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
 If the vessel is not detained (1- Dm) 
−(0 + 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
Overall payoff: 
−(𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2)) 
If port authorities do not inspect the vessel, the detention will not occur and the values of the 
inspection-related parameters will be 0, including the expected detention cost, the expected 
social welfare loss and the inspection cost.  Meanwhile, the risk of being detained is free. As a 
result, the payoff equation is simplified as: 
Payoff of port authorities = (– Expected social welfare loss of accident + port charges) (3) 
Payoff of ship owners = - (Expected accident loss + maintenance cost + port charges) 
(4) 
Scenario 3: No inspection (port authorities) and standard vessel (ship owners) 
In this scenario, the payoffs of the port authority and ship owners are described as follows 
respectively.  
(1) Payoff of port authorities 
−𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
(2) Payoff of ship owners 
−(𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
Scenario 4: No inspection (port authorities) and sub-standard vessel (ship owners) 
In this scenario, the payoffs of port authorities and ship owners are described as follows 
respectively.  
(1) Payoff of port authorities 
−𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
(2) Payoff of ship owners 
−(𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
Summarizing the scenarios above, the payoff matrix of the strategic inspection game is 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Payoff matrix of PSC inspection game 
 Standard vessel Sub-standard vessel 
Inspection 
𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
 
−(𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 +
𝐶(𝑃𝑀 ,𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)  
𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 − 𝐷𝑚 ×
(𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2)  
 
−(𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 +
𝐶(𝑃𝑚,𝑚) + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2))  
No 
inspection 
−𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
−(𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀 , 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
−𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
−(𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚,𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
 
3.2.4 Nash equilibrium solution 
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution concept in the game theory. It captures 
a steady state of the play of a strategic game in which each player holds the correct expectation 
about the other players’ behaviour and acts rationally. When it comes to a Nash equilibrium, 
no players have another action yielding a better outcome given that every other player chooses 
his/her equilibrium action.  
For the inspection game in this study, the choices of players are not deterministic but are 
regulated by probabilistic rules. The Nash equilibrium under this condition is called mix 
strategy Nash equilibrium, and the aim of this section is to find out the mix strategy Nash 
equilibrium for the PSC inspection game.  
According to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), there is a useful way to calculate mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 
For a finite strategic game G, α is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G if and only if for 
every player i in the game, every pure strategy in the support of αi is the best response to α-i. 
(αi means the mixed strategy of player i in the mixed Nash equilibrium, while α-i means the 
mixed strategies of players without player i.) 
In other words,  
Every action in the support of any player’s equilibrium mixed strategy yields the same payoff 
for that player.  
Based on this principle, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution in this study is obtained 
in Table 4. 
Table 4. The simplified payoff matrix 
 Standard vessel(Y) Sub-standard vessel(1-Y) 
Inspection(X) PA11, SO11 PA12, SO12 
No inspection(1-X) PA21, SO21 PA22, SO22 
 
Table 4 presents the simplified payoff matrix. In terms of the payoffs in this table, the equation 
set is shown as follows 
{
𝑌 × 𝑃𝐴11 + (1 − 𝑌) × 𝑃𝐴12 = 𝑌 × 𝑃𝐴21 + (1 − 𝑌) × 𝑃𝐴22
𝑋 × 𝑆𝑂11 + (1 − 𝑋) × 𝑆𝑂21 = 𝑋 × 𝑆𝑂12 + (1 − 𝑋) × 𝑆𝑂22
 
Where PA means port authority, SO means ship owner. The first number in each cell represents 
the payoff of port authorities, while the second represents the one of ship owners.  
The equilibrium point is: 
 
 
{
 
 𝑋 =
𝑆𝑂22 − 𝑆𝑂21
𝑆𝑂11 + 𝑆𝑂22 − 𝑆𝑂12 − 𝑆𝑂21
𝑌 =
𝑃𝐴22 − 𝑃𝐴12
𝑃𝐴11 + 𝑃𝐴22 − 𝑃𝐴12 − 𝑃𝐴21
 
 
(5) 
After plugging the payoffs into the corresponding places in equation (5), the Nash equilibrium 
of the strategic game between port authorities and ship owners is presented in Equation 6 and 
Equation 7, respectively: 
 
 
𝑋∗ =
{
 
 
 
 𝑋0:
𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) − 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚)
𝐶𝐷1 × (𝐷𝑀 −𝐷𝑚) + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2)
0, 𝑌∗ > 𝑌0
𝑋0, 𝑌
∗ = 𝑌0
1, 𝑌∗ < 𝑌0
 
 
(6) 
  
𝑌∗ =
{
 
 
 
 𝑌0:
𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2) − 𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷2 + 𝐶𝐼1
𝐶𝐷2 × (𝐷𝑀 − 𝐷𝑚) + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2)
1, 𝑋∗ > 𝑋0
𝑌0, 𝑋
∗ = 𝑋0
0, 𝑋∗ < 𝑋0
 
 
(7) 
 
This means that if 𝑌∗ > 𝑌0 , port authorities will not inspect the vessel; if 𝑌
∗ < 𝑌0 , port 
authorities will inspect the vessel. Only when 𝑌∗ = 𝑌0 will port authorities choose the mix 
strategy 𝑋∗ = 𝑋0. The same goes to ship owners.  
According to assumption (6) in Section 3.2.1, the accident loss under standard and sub-standard 
conditions are set the same (CA1= CA2 = CA0, where CA0 is a constant no matter the vessel is 
standard or not). Therefore, the final Nash equilibrium solution is defined as follows. 
 
 
𝑋∗ =
{
 
 
 
 𝑋0:
(𝑃𝑀 − 𝑃𝑚) × 𝐶𝐴
0 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) − 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚)
𝐶𝐷1 × (𝐷𝑀 − 𝐷𝑚) + 𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴
0 × (𝑃𝑀 − 𝑃𝑚)
0, 𝑌∗ > 𝑌0
𝑋0, 𝑌
∗ = 𝑌0
1, 𝑌∗ < 𝑌0
 
 
(8) 
 
 
𝑌∗ =
{
 
 
 
 𝑌0:
𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2) − 𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷2 + 𝐶𝐼1
𝐶𝐷2 × (𝐷𝑀 − 𝐷𝑚) + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2)
1, 𝑋∗ > 𝑋0
𝑌0, 𝑋
∗ = 𝑋0
0, 𝑋∗ < 𝑋0
 
 
(9) 
 
4. Empirical study and result analysis 
To characterize the optimal inspection policy for bulk carriers with respect to the Paris MoU, 
Nash equilibrium solutions need to be analysed through a numerical case. However, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to acquire the data information of all parameters. Previous scholars 
chose to simulate the parameter values or discuss them by empirical data (e.g. Florens & 
Foucher, 1999). Nevertheless, there exists too much noisy vessel data, which requires a 
screening process before using them in this study. In this paper, data come from three different 
databases: basic vessel information database (mainly from World Shipping Encyclopedia), 
casualty database (mainly from the International Maritime Organization and Lloyd's Register 
of Shipping), and PSC Inspection database of the Paris MoU. The objective is to find out the 
optimal inspection policy for port authorities.  
4.1 BN for calculating the detention rate of PSC inspections  
A dataset consisting of 49328 PSC inspection records in 2015-2017 based on the Paris MoU is 
developed to construct the BN. Among them, 10000 inspection records related to bulker 
carriers and from nine major members of the Paris MoU are selected to form a bulk carrier 
dataset used in this work.  
Figure 2 shows the result of detention analysis based on the BN model. It indicates that the 
detention rate of bulk carriers is estimated as 3.25% given the input data covering the period 
of 2015-2017. If we calculate the detention rate from database directly1, the result is 3.23%, 
which shows a harmony with the result delivered by the model. The model is verified in 
terms of prediction of detention rate of bulk carriers. 
 
Figure 2. Result of the PSC BN 
Since the model developed is proved reliable (Yang et al., 2018), it can be used to predict the 
detention rate of PSC inspection when any new evidence is observed and collected. Based on 
the function, the detention rates of different safety levels of any investigated vessel can be 
obtained.  
(1) Standard vessels 
If a ship owner makes high intensity effort in maintaining his/her vessel, the vessel will be 
maintained at a standard safety level and reach the criteria of inspection regulations. During an 
inspection, the detention risk of the vessel is relatively low, which means the two 
comprehensive factors ‘inspection group’ and ‘vessel group’ that represent two aspects of 
detention risk are both at a low level. From the BN reasoning, the detention rate is calculated 
as 0.46% (decrease from the average 3.25%). 
                                                 
1 Although based on the database we can calculate the average detention rate of a bulk carrier, but it cannot be 
used for any other advanced detention analysis for a specific selected bulk carrier as the BN does.   
(2) Sub-standard vessels 
Accordingly, a sub-standard vessel is more likely to be caught in detention. It indicates the two 
major risk factors (i.e. ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’), are at the ‘high detention risk’ 
state. The result of the BN reasoning reveals that the detention rate of a sub-standard vessel is 
58.8% (increased from the average 3.25%). 
4.2 Determination of the other parameters  
4.2.1 Maintenance cost and accident loss 
The maintenance cost is crucial for ship owners and it is affected by a large number of factors, 
e.g. vessel age, material price, regional differences and damage degree. In addition, the effort 
of ship owners also needs to be considered as an important factor.  
Table 5 shows the maintenance cost under different conditions. It contains the maintenance 
cost of bulk carriers with different sizes and ages in a certain period. For example, the repair 
and maintenances cost for a young bulk ship with standard effort is US $200,175, while it is 
only US $120,105 with sub-standard effort (Drewy Shipping Concultants, 2012).  
According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Review of 
Maritime Transport 2016, there are five types of bulk carriers: small, handysize, handymax, 
panamax and capesize. The size of five types of vessels is incremental. Based on this, vessel 
size in this paper is separated into two states: small, handysize and handymax bulk carriers as 
‘Small’, panama and capsize bulk carriers as ‘Large’.  
Vessel age is classified into three groups ‘Young 0-5 years’, ‘Medium 6-10 years’ and ‘Old 
over 10 years’.  
Table 5. Estimated approximate repair and maintenances under different conditions (US$) 
Vessel size Small 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Bulk carrier 200175 120105 440385 190166 447057 266900 
Vessel size Large 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Bulk carrier 319650 191790 703230 303667 713885 426200 
Source: Drewy Shipping Consultants Ltd. 
Meanwhile, as mentioned in the parameter identification, the value of vessels is viewed as the 
accident loss of ship owners. Therefore, the price of second-hand vessels is used as the accident 
loss in this work.  
 
Table 6. Estimated accident loss under different conditions (US$M) 
Vessel size Small Large 
Vessel age Young Medium Old Young Medium    Old 
Bulk carrier -31 -28 -11 -67 -53 -20 
Source: Drewy Shipping Consultants Ltd 
 
4.2.2 Accident rate 
The accident rate is calculated by using a logit model (Li et al.,2014), which is an exponential 
function of various influencing factors shown below. 
𝑋𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑆 +∑𝛽𝑖+2𝑉𝑇𝑖
5
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝑆 + +𝛽9𝐹𝑆 +∑𝛽𝑗+9
30
𝑗=1
𝑍𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖  
where: 
VA: vessel age.  
VS: vessel size.   
VT: vessel type. VTi=1 if it is a dry cargo ship, otherwise VTi=0, i = 1, 2, …, 4 indicating the 
four different vessel types, namely dry cargo, bulk carrier, tanker and container. 
CS: classification society. If the vessel is a member of IACS, CS=1; otherwise CS=0 
FS: flag state. If the vessel’s flag is a close registry, FS=1; otherwise FS=0 
Zj: dummy variables representing different geographical zones. In this paper, we divide the 
world into 31 zones according to the World Casualty Statistics. Each zone has its own effect 
on the accident probability. 
µi: stochastic component that follows the logistic distribution. 
According to the definition of logistic distribution, the accident rates of different vessels are 
calculated by: 
 
?̂?𝑖 =
𝑒∑𝛽𝑖𝑋
1 + 𝑒∑𝛽𝑖𝑋
 
 
(10) 
Through applying the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) method, the estimation of βi is 
obtained.  
Eventually, by inserting the values of corresponding parameters into equation (10), the accident 
rates of bulker carriers under different situations are obtained and presented in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Accident rates of bulk carriers 
Vessel size Small 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Accident rate 0.106 0.278 0.0959 0.26 0.0643 0.227 
Vessel size Large 
Vessel age Young Medium Old  
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Accident rate 0.164 0.299 0.111 0.234 0.0669 0.249 
 
4.2.3 Detention cost  
Because of the detention punishment from port authorities, avoiding detention with minimum 
effort is the primary goal of ship owners. At the same time, detention punishment helps regulate 
the behaviours of ship owners from the perspective of port authorities. Hence, the detention 
cost (or the detention punishment) CD is a focus of both sides. 
If CD is not large enough, ship owners may maintain their vessels at a sub-standard safety level. 
In order to reduce the social welfare loss, port authorities have to increase the inspection rate 
or extend the detention time; if CD is large enough, ship owners will turn to improve the quality 
of vessels, resulting in less inspection costs and a lower accident rate. 
In this paper, we assume that CD has a liner relationship with the expected accident loss of sub-
standard vessels, as the punishment policy aims at dealing with illegal actions and sub-standard 
safety level of the inspected vessels.   
𝐶𝐷 = 𝜔𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑚 
where 𝜔  representing the punishment intensity, is a positive value and is set differently 
according to different port inspection policies.  
4.3 Optimal inspection rate   
As discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2, all the parameters in equation (8) are constant values, 
except the detention cost. The detention cost is a dynamic parameter that varies with the 
punishment intensity ω. That is to say, the optimal inspection rate is actually a function of the 
punishment severity ω, denoted as X (ω). 
Because ω is a positive variable related to the port inspection regulations, it is impractical to 
fix it at a certain value to satisfy all the cases. Hence, in this study, the punishment severity is 
changed to see the optimal inspection rates in various circumstances.  
The following table shows the optimal inspection rates when 𝜔 changes from 0 to 20 (𝜔 is 
integar). 
Table 8. Optimal inspection rates with different punishment severity levels 
 Small Large 
 Young Medium Old Young Medium Old 
ω=1 65.025% 63.184% 64.793% 53.061% 55.913% 67.126% 
ω=2 40.343% 39.316% 41.103% 31.518% 33.892% 42.716% 
ω=3 29.243% 28.536% 30.098% 22.417% 24.315% 31.325% 
ω=4 22.933% 22.396% 23.741% 17.394% 18.958% 24.730% 
ω=5 18.863% 18.430% 19.602% 14.210% 15.536% 20.429% 
ω=6 16.020% 15.657% 16.691% 12.011% 13.160% 17.403% 
ω=7 13.921% 13.610% 14.533% 10.402% 11.414% 15.157% 
ω=8 12.309% 12.036% 12.870% 9.173% 10.078% 13.425% 
ω=9 11.031% 10.788% 11.548% 8.203% 9.021% 12.048% 
ω=10 9.994% 9.775% 10.472% 7.419% 8.165% 10.927% 
ω=11 9.135% 8.936% 9.580% 6.772% 7.457% 9.997% 
ω=12 8.412% 8.229% 8.827% 6.229% 6.863% 9.213% 
ω=13 7.795% 7.626% 8.185% 5.766% 6.356% 8.543% 
ω=14 7.262% 7.106% 7.629% 5.367% 5.919% 7.964% 
ω=15 6.798% 6.652% 7.144% 5.020% 5.538% 7.458% 
ω=16 6.389% 6.252% 6.717% 4.715% 5.203% 7.013% 
ω=17 6.027% 5.898% 6.339% 4.445% 4.906% 6.618% 
ω=18 5.703% 5.581% 6.000% 4.205% 4.642% 6.265% 
ω=19 5.413% 5.297% 5.696% 3.989% 4.404% 5.948% 
ω=20 5.151% 5.041% 5.422% 3.794% 4.190% 5.661% 
 
Based on the information in table 8, figure 5 provides a diagram to describe the tendency of 
optimal inspection rates when the punishment severity changes.  
 Figure 3. Trend of optimal inspection rate 
From table 8 and figure 3, several conclusions are made and research implications are derived. 
(1) With the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection rates see a decreasing 
trend regardless the vessel conditions.  
For example, the optimal inspection rate of small and young bulk carriers at ω=1 is 65.025% 
and falls to 18.863% when ω increases to 5.  
Actually, when calculating an optimal inspection rate, the only variable in equation (8) is the 
severity degree ω. Other parameters, like the accident rate, accident loss, they are all constant. 
Hence, the function of optimal inspection rate can be written as  
𝑋(𝜔) =
𝑎3
𝑎1𝜔 + 𝑎2
  
where a1, a2, a3 are positive constant.  
Because of the positive value of ω, therefore, the first derivative test of the optimal inspection 
rate is 
𝑋′(𝜔) = −
𝑎1𝑎3
(𝑎1𝜔 + 𝑎2)2
 
 
𝑋′(𝜔) < 0 means the optimal inspection rate is a decreasing function and does not have an 
extremum. The limiting case lies that when ω is infinitely great, the optimal inspection rate of 
bulkers is infinitely close to zero regardless the safety condition and characteristics of the vessel.  
(2) The declining speed of the optimal inspection rates slows down with the increase of 
the punishment severity.  
It can be explained from a mathematical perspective: 
The second derivative test of the optimal inspection rate is: 
𝑋′′(𝜔) =
2𝑎1
2𝑎3
(𝑎1𝜔 + 𝑎2)3
 
Because ω is a positive variable, 
𝑋′′(𝜔) > 0 
If the second derivative test of a function is always positive no matter how the variable changes, 
the first derivative test is an increasing function. When combining it with the result 
that 𝑋′(𝜔) < 0, we disclose that 𝑋′(𝜔) is a negative increasing function and |𝑋′(𝜔)| is a 
positive decreasing function.  
When represented in the graph, 𝑋′(𝜔)  reflexes the slope of the line  𝑋 (𝜔) , and |𝑋′(𝜔)| 
measures the steepness or grade of the line. Therefore, a positive decreasing nature of |𝑋′(𝜔)| 
indicates the line of optimal inspection rate is steeper at first and tends to be smooth with the 
increase of the punishment severity.  
In fact, the variation trend reveals that with the increase of the punishment intensity, the sub-
standard ship owners’ motivation on implementing better safety maintenance policy becomes 
lower and lower.  
(3) Vessel age has little influence on the optimal inspection rates of small bulk carriers. 
Table 9 illustrate the standard deviation of small bulk carriers. It is obvious that the standard 
deviation of small bulk carriers is always low no matter how the punishment intensity changes. 
It means that the dispersion of the data is kept at a low level under all the circumstances. Hence, 
for small bulk carriers, vessel age has no influence on their optimal inspection rates.  
Table 9. The standard deviation of small bulk carriers 
Small 
 
Young Medium Old Standard deviation 
ω=1 65.03% 63.18% 64.79% 0.82% 
ω=2 40.34% 39.32% 41.10% 0.73% 
ω=3 29.24% 28.54% 30.10% 0.64% 
ω=4 22.93% 22.40% 23.74% 0.55% 
ω=5 18.86% 18.43% 19.60% 0.48% 
ω=6 16.02% 15.66% 16.69% 0.43% 
ω=7 13.92% 13.61% 14.53% 0.38% 
ω=8 12.31% 12.04% 12.87% 0.35% 
ω=9 11.03% 10.79% 11.55% 0.32% 
ω=10 9.99% 9.78% 10.47% 0.29% 
ω=11 9.14% 8.94% 9.58% 0.27% 
ω=12 8.41% 8.23% 8.83% 0.25% 
ω=13 7.80% 7.63% 8.19% 0.23% 
ω=14 7.26% 7.11% 7.63% 0.22% 
ω=15 6.80% 6.65% 7.14% 0.21% 
ω=16 6.39% 6.25% 6.72% 0.20% 
ω=17 6.03% 5.90% 6.34% 0.19% 
ω=18 5.70% 5.58% 6.00% 0.18% 
ω=19 5.41% 5.30% 5.70% 0.17% 
ω=20 5.15% 5.04% 5.42% 0.16% 
 
(4) Large and old bulk carriers have the highest optimal inspection rates. 
This finding indicates that large and old bulk carriers have higher detention risks than others, 
prompting port authorities to pay more attention on these types of bulk carriers.  
(5) For young and medium bulk carriers, vessel size has more influential power than 
vessel age in PSC.  
To compare the effect of vessel size and vessel age on the optimal inspection rate, sensitivity 
analysis is conducted. When locking one factor and changing the states of another factor (target 
factor), the change of optimal inspection rate is measured as the effect of the target factor in 
this scenario.  
For example, when ω=1, if the vessel is a small vessel, it can be observed that the optimal rate 
of young small vessel is 65.03%. On the other hand, the medium small vessel is 63.184%. 
Therefore, the different value 1.84% is the effect of vessel age on the optimal inspection rate 
when locking vessel size at ‘small’ and ω=1. Table 10 shows the individual effect of vessel 
size and vessel age in different scenarios.  
Table 10. Effect of vessel age and vessel size 
Target factor Vessel age Vessel size 
Locked state Small Large Young Old 
ω=1 1.84% 2.85% 11.96% 7.27% 
ω=2 1.03% 2.37% 8.83% 5.42% 
ω=3 0.71% 1.90% 6.83% 4.22% 
ω=4 0.54% 1.56% 5.54% 3.44% 
ω=5 0.43% 1.33% 4.65% 2.89% 
ω=6 0.36% 1.15% 4.01% 2.50% 
ω=7 0.31% 1.01% 3.52% 2.20% 
ω=8 0.27% 0.90% 3.14% 1.96% 
ω=9 0.24% 0.82% 2.83% 1.77% 
ω=10 0.22% 0.75% 2.58% 1.61% 
ω=11 0.20% 0.68% 2.36% 1.48% 
ω=12 0.18% 0.63% 2.18% 1.37% 
ω=13 0.17% 0.59% 2.03% 1.27% 
ω=14 0.16% 0.55% 1.90% 1.19% 
ω=15 0.15% 0.52% 1.78% 1.11% 
ω=16 0.14% 0.49% 1.67% 1.05% 
ω=17 0.13% 0.46% 1.58% 0.99% 
ω=18 0.12% 0.44% 1.50% 0.94% 
ω=19 0.12% 0.42% 1.42% 0.89% 
ω=20 0.11% 0.40% 1.36% 0.85% 
 
It is obvious that vessel size has more influence on the inspection rate than vessel age under 
various situations. However, the tendency of the impact magnitude gradually decreases when 
the punishment intensity of port authorities is higher and higher.  
4.4 Recommendations for port authorities   
This section illustrates how the proposed model and theoretical optimal inspection rates can 
help port authorities to make their optimal decision in PSC inspections. It is noteworthy that 
the prerequisite of the suggestion is that port authorities and ship owners make their decisions 
independently, and both of them are not aware of the choice of the other.  
According to the historical inspection data, port authorities can figure out the average detention 
time of detained bulk carriers under different scenarios, and then calculate the possible social 
welfare increase per inspection. Based on the proposed optimal inspection rate equation, the 
optimal inspection rates of vessels under different conditions can be obtained when inserting 
corresponding values, denoted as Xi (i represents the vessels with different status). Meanwhile, 
the historical data can tell the numbers of bulker arriving at port per day, denoted as Ni. 
Therefore, the optimal number of PSC inspections at the port per vessel type per day is Xi Ni, 
which is useful for port authorities when formulating its inspection regulations.  
However, sometimes the resources that port authorities have in reality do not support them to 
do the exact number of inspections that the Nash solution suggests. On this occasion, port 
authorities have two strategies: 
 Increase the resources for PSC inspection, e.g. PSC inspectors (human resources), funding 
and operational expenditure. 
 If it is not possible to increase the resources, port authorities can use the equation (2) to 
improve its inspection policy.  
1) Based on the limited resources port authorities have, the maximum number of 
inspections per day is obtained, which is set as the improved optimal inspection rate Xi
’ 
2) Input Xi’ into equation and use the backward calculation to get the detention loss CD’ 
and new punishment severity degree ω’.  Because Xi’ < Xi, then CD’ > CD, ω’ > ω. Port 
authorities can increase the punishment severity degree for the optimal inspection 
equation.  
In general, when port authorities have sufficient resources, they should choose the optimal 
inspection rate; otherwise they can increase the punishment severity level to tackle the sub-
standard effort and illegal actions of ship owners.  
5. Conclusion 
Despite the fact that PSC inspections came into force for many years, we still see many vessels 
failing to pass their inspections according to the Paris MoU inspection records. The main reason 
lies behind this phenomenon is that the interests of port authorities and ship owners are opposite 
to each other. Meanwhile, since 2009, the performance of ISM companies has been listed as 
one of the important factors in PSC inspections. There are few studies, based on the authors’ 
best knowledge, investigating the new inspection relationships in recent years.  
In this study, a risk-based game model is constructed to figure out the optimal inspection policy 
for port authorities since the implementation of NIR in 2009. To facilitate the study, a BN is 
developed based on the inspection data of bulk carriers in 2015-2017 involving nine major 
countries from the Paris MoU. It is noteworthy that company performance, which is among the 
most important indicators in NIR, is considered in the BN model to generate the comprehensive 
detention rate function. The result of BN risk analysis helps determine the detention rate of 
standard and sub-standard vessels, as well as provides valuable input information for the game 
model. Through a payoff matrix, the factors influencing the game between the port authorities 
and ship owners are connected. The incorporation of BN and game model, for the first time, 
describes the PSC inspection game comprehensively and concretely, presenting the decision-
making process of both stakeholders. By calculating the Nash equilibrium solutions of the 
game model, the optimal inspection rates for port authorities and the optimal maintenance rate 
for ship owners are obtained.  
More precisely, the result reveals the optimal inspection rates of bulk carriers under different 
conditions from a port authority viewpoint. It can be used as a real-time decision tool for port 
authorities to respond to ships of different risk profiles under various dynamic situations.  The 
associated variables include the general maintenance cost of the inspection period, the 
investigated accident rate and accident loss, and the punishment severity of the port.     
As to the Nash equilibrium solution, new managerial insights are established and verified 
through an empirical study investigating the inspections happened in 2015-2017. For example, 
1) with the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection rates present a decreasing 
trend regardless the vessel conditions. 2) The declining speed of the optimal inspection rates 
slows down with the increase of the punishment severity level. 3) Vessel age has little influence 
on the optimal inspection rates of small bulk carriers. 4) Large and old bulk carriers have the 
highest inspection rates. 5) For young and medium bulk carriers, vessel size is a factor of more 
influential power than vessel age in PSC. The above managerial insights can be served as useful 
information for i) the port authorities when formulating their inspection policy regarding the 
bulk carrier part and ii) the ship owners when minimizing their ships detention rate given 
economic constrains.   
Based on the findings, there are two suggestions for port authorities when formulating their 
inspection policies respectively. 
 If having sufficient resources for inspections, port authorities can use the calculated 
optimal inspection rate to determine the number of inspected bulk carriers per day.  
 If there are limited inspection resources, port authorities can use the backward calculation 
function to increase the vessel detention time based on the maximum number of 
inspections it can afford per day.  
Further effort will focus on the improvement of the game model, taking into account the effect 
of repair at port due to detention, the severity classification of accidents and corresponding 
accident loss. Data acquisition (i.e. the statistics of total accident loss) presents another issue 
to investigate in the future research agenda. 
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